You will note, those who read this column (or, in the case of Natal graduates, have it read out to them), that, a few columns ago, I wrote that the Medupi power station was not going to generate any power by year-end.

Eskom has now confirmed this, and has issued a statement to the effect that the cost (excluding construction interest) has gone from R87-billion to R105-billion.

The use of a ‘billion’ is very handy. To say that the cost of a packet of sugar has gone up from 87c to R1.05 could well cause an outcry over the 20% cost increase. To say that a power plant which was estimated at R87 000 000 000 has gone to R105 000 000 000 just numbs the brain.

You could reflect that the increase is equal to the budget income of the Island of Mauritius. You could say that you can build 36 000 houses with it and that it is nearly enough for Chancellor House (the African National Congress-owned subcon- tractor to Medupi boiler supplier Hitachi) to give everybody a really good bonus.

What you may not say is that it has all happened before – which it has.

In the early 1980s, the Nationalist government realised that, as far as petroleum products were concerned, South Africa would, owing to sanctions, be cut off from overseas supplies of oil. We would not be cut off from oil products entirely, since we still had Sasol I and II and III – the oil from coal plants. But we would be cut off from shipping oil.

So, the Nationalist government set contracts for operators to drill for oil off the South African coast. A number of reserves were discovered, all of gas. So, because the okes at Sasol were very smart, it was decided to build an onshore gas-to-liquids plant at Mossel Bay.

This is where the politicians stepped, or rather, waded, in. As the word got out, the land near the proposed refinery reached record levels as it was bought, sold and resold by those with political connections. Then construction started. Contracts were given out to various (fairly competent) contractors for design and installation.

But, but, but. As design progressed, costs went through the roof. From an initial cost estimate of about R8-billion (I recall), costs went up at about R1-billion a year and there were quite a few years since the project fell behind, further and further.

One of the problems was that nobody, worldwide, had built such a large gas- to-liquid oil plant before. Thus, progress, construction and the technology learning curve matched each other.

The problem was that some of the contracts were corrupt. Not very deeply so, but corrupt, nonetheless. Money was poured into the contract and accusations, some of them valid, of political enrichment flew. When, it was asked, if ever, would this white elephant of a project come to an end? Finally it did.

The Nationalist government, which at least wanted to gain some high ground, appointed a commission to investigate the project. Out of this came a report which became known as the Brooks Report, written by consultant Murray Brooks, of the US.

The report was very thick, unemotional, easy to read and factual. The verdict was “slightly guilty but not really so”. In vindication of this, Mossgas continued production and soon began over- taking production estimates to become a highly valuable and worthwhile energy production unit. It was over- budget but it soon made up for that and does to this day.

There are a number of differ- ences between Mossgas and Medupi. There were no strikes at Mossgas and the technology was brand-new and not well known, which is not the case with Medupi. The construction quality assurance (according to the Brooks report) was first class – no dodgy welds as we have had at Medupi. Probably most significantly and easily forgotten is that the Nationalist government did not own a company which had shares in a company given contracts by a government company, which is the case at Medupi. If they had, the outcry would have been huge and loud. The more things change, the more they stay the same. Not unusual in Africa.