Name of the Project
Grand Inga hydropower project.

Location
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Project Owner/s
DRC government.

Project Description
The project, which will be located on the Congo river, is expected to have a capacity of 44 000 MW once all the phases are complete.

The dam will be built in six phases.

Inga 1 (1 351 MW) and Inga 2 (1 424 MW) were commissioned in 1972 and 1982 respectively.

Inga 3 is in the design phase, with the ultimate design and size being a subject of significant debate.

The construction of the successive phases of Grand Inga will hinge on the availability of a market and funding for the projects. 

South Africa is expected to buy 2 500 MW of Inga 3’s capacity.

Potential Job Creation
Not stated.

Capital Expenditure
Inga 3 is expected to cost an estimated $13.9-billion to $17.9-billion to complete. The development of the project will be implemented through a public–private partnership.

The cost of the entire Grand Inga project is estimated at between $50-billion and $80-billion.

Planned Start/End Date
Inga 3 has been delayed by about eight years and has been in the pipeline for decades.

Latest Developments
Civil society organisations International Rivers and WoMin African Alliance have published a report that they say provides, for the first time, an independent and authoritative account of the true cost of the Inga 3 hydropower project for South Africa.
 
The report’s conclusions are “dire yet clear” in that offtaking hydropower from Inga 3 will be “too costly and an unmitigated disaster” for the country, the organisations state.

South Africa intends to procure at least 2 500 MW of hydropower produced at Inga 3, but construction on the project has yet to start. The TMP Systems study ‘Inga 3: Too High a Cost A Study of the Socio-Economic Costs of the Inga 3 dam for South Africa’ estimates that Inga 3, if it is built at all, will not begin producing power until 2032.

Further findings of the report, suggest that State-owned power utility Eskom would have to generate an additional R6.1-billion to R9.1-billion in revenue a year to break even on electricity bought from Inga 3.

“The Inga 3 dam and its transmission line would have significant negative social impacts and adversely impact between 210 000 and 333 000 people within South Africa,” the report laments, emphasising that “Inga 3 would create virtually no new jobs in South Africa”.

Comparable investments in wind and solar, however, could create about 8 096 full-time jobs for South Africans.

Overall, the report found that South Africa’s continued reliance on Inga 3 in its energy plans represents “a grave risk” to the country’s energy security.

The report further assesses the socioeconomic impact of the Inga 3 dam with a particular focus on South African citizens and on women.

It also discusses the commercial case for the dam, comparing it with alternatives on price, before weighing positive and negative social and environmental impacts against each other.

Overall, the report suggests that Inga 3 will deliver poor outcomes for South Africans at a high cost.

The study recommends that South Africa instead invest in domestic solar and wind generation, which would save “millions of dollars” while serving as a vehicle for job creation.

The policy brief draws out key findings from the report, as well as additional expert analysis, to consider the risks and costs that South Africa is exposed to through Inga 3.

It further shows that these costs will only increase if South Africa fails to act, as the country will either “be saddled with an expensive and damaging source of energy at some uncertain point in the future, or it will be left with a giant hole in its energy plans”, thereby stifling development and the growth of renewable energy.

Key Contracts, Suppliers and Consultants
None stated.

Contact Details for Project Information
Embassy of DRC in South Africa, tel +27 12 344 6475 and fax +27 12 344 4054.