Transitions are never easy. They are disruptive and are often fiercely resisted.

South Africa navigated its own grand political transition in 1994, following a period of intense uncertainty and resistance, which at times turned deadly. Were it not for courageous leaders, ongoing mobilisation in support of change, and the favourable geopolitical tailwinds of the period, the outcome could have been quite different.

More than 30 years later, South Africa is now pursuing some microeconomic transitions, which are necessary (albeit insufficient on their own) to start loosening the shackles of low growth, which underpins the country’s extreme unemployment crisis.

These transitions are also throwing up new uncertainties and resistance, as they affect parts of the economy where changes will have outsized impacts on individuals, businesses and the country’s investment prospects.

They involve decisions that move well beyond matters of principle and involve complex decisions and trade-offs.

In some areas, such as municipal reform, the transition is nascent. In other areas, notably electricity, we have truly entered the business end of the reform process.

While the decisions are ultimately driven by changing techno-economics, the debates have assumed an ideological tone. They are also playing themselves out not only in the traditional spheres of law- and policy-making, but also on social media platforms, where there is little to no room for nuance and compromise.

In the context of the electricity transition, where the risks of vertical integration have already materialised with devastating effects for security of supply and tariffs, the reform should be driven primarily with a consumer-first mindset. One that makes a clean break from recent crises to place security of supply at the lowest possible cost for households and businesses (including businesses where access to clean electricity is becoming essential to their continued competitiveness) at the very centre.

Instead, the Department of Electricity and Energy, as it is currently structured, has a strong incentive to view the transition through the distorted lens of being both the shareholder of the dominant producer, Eskom, and the policymaker.

It is a serious conflict of interest, made worse by the fact that the department is new and undercapacitated. By contrast, Eskom, which is by far the largest entity under the department’s aegis, may be financially weak, but it has technical and intellectual resources that the department simply cannot match.

Eskom is, thus, in an incredibly powerful position to shape policy in its image and likeness, rather than simply implement policy that has been determined by the department in consultation with all stakeholders, and where Eskom’s voice is but one of many to be considered.

That’s not to say Eskom’s voice should be muted. It has every right to state its position and persuade others of the correctness of its stance. But it should not and cannot be the dominant voice. Nor should it be allowed to use regulatory and legal delay tactics in anticipation of a more favourable political dispensation at some future date.