On August 20, Mineral Resources and Energy Minister Gwede Mantashe made some interesting comments to journalists regarding future nuclear energy in South Africa. “It comes back to a resolution we took as government not going big bang into nuclear, but going at a pace and price that the country can afford,” he said. “Go modular, go at a pace and price that the country can afford . . . The fact that we suspected corruption [in the previously planned new nuclear power programme] doesn’t mean that nuclear is irrelevant for the country in 2019.” He also affirmed that the country’s Integrated Resource Plan made provision for “modular nuclear technology”.

Modular nuclear. That phrase brings back memories of South Africa’s Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) programme, cancelled in 2010, after having more than R7.2-billion invested into it. However, before going further, it is necessary to caution that the Minister may (as a colleague pointed out to me) merely have made a slip of the tongue. He might have meant “incremental”. That is, build conventional nuclear power plants (NPPs), but one by one, in separate projects, and not build three or four – totalling perhaps as many as eight or nine large pressurised water reactors (PWRs) – in one giant programme. Such an approach would reduce upfront costs (and the problem with nuclear is that its costs are almost all upfront; once built, NPPs are incredibly cheap to run).

However, it would also make it impossible to create a significant nuclear manufacturing industry in South Africa. The creation of such an industry was one of the ambitions underlying the previous large-scale new NPP acquisition and construction programme, because such a large programme would have created the – pardon the pun – critical mass needed to make the setting up of such an industrial sector financially viable. A programme of one NPP at a time, with uncertainty over when the next one would be ordered – if it was ordered – would not provide local industry with the certainty needed to justify the significant investments, in skills and quality, required to engage in nuclear manufacturing.

However, let us assume Mantashe did not make a slip of the tongue and did mean “modular”. Effectively, all modular reactor designs are for small reactors, which is what the PBMR would have been. But not all small reactors are modular. Small nonmodular reactors have been operating safely for decades, but in niche applications – including nuclear-powered submarines.

“Many member States are focusing on the development of small modular reactors (SMRs), which are defined as advanced reactors that produce electricity of up to 300 MW(e) per module,” states the International Atomic Energy Agency on its website. “These reactors have advanced engineered [sic] features, are deployable either as a single or multimodule plant, and are designed to be built in factories and shipped to utilities for installation as demand arises. There are about 50 SMR designs and concepts globally . . . There are currently four SMRs in advanced stages of construction in Argentina, China and Russia.”

Yes, Argentina has been able to overtake South Africa. Their unit is designated CAREM-25 and is an industrial prototype with a generating capacity of 25 MW. It is hoped it will start operating in 2021. A simplified and downsized PWR, it was conceived in 1984, but then halted (for political reasons) before being restarted in 2006.

But the Chinese SMR is not a simplified, downsized PWR. It is designated the High Temperature Reactor-Pebble Bed Module (HTR-PM), and is an industrial demonstration plant. Yes, the PBMR concept is alive and well, but in China. After successful testing of the 10 MW pilot HTR-10 unit, the HTR-PM project was launched in 2001. Now completed, it is currently undergoing commissioning. (It should be noted that there are also other SMR projects in China, involving different designs, agencies and companies.)

It should also be pointed out that Canada, the UK and the US are actively developing SMRs, mainly of the small PWR type. In all three countries, these programmes are being undertaken by the private sector, but with what could be described as strategic financial support, in the form of grants, investments and/or contracts, from their respective governments. Indeed, the UK government has also given such support to non-UK enterprises, provided they have demonstrated a commitment to manufacturing their SMRs in Britain (as well as in their home markets). (See, for example, Engineering News August 9, 2019.)

So, is Mantashe hinting at restarting the PBMR project? Or, and this would be a bitter irony, importing SMR technologies from other countries? Indeed, could the PBMR project be reactivated? In theory, yes. After all, Argentina successfully revived its CAREM project. And Eskom does have a small office looking into restarting the PBMR. But, as the great American baseball coach Yogi Berra reportedly observed, “[i]n theory, theory and practice are the same, in practice, they aren’t”.

South Africa still possesses intellectual property (IP) developed by the PBMR company. But, while the core IP would still be valid, most of the highly-skilled and experienced people are long gone, scattered to the winds. It is believed that many of the key staff were recruited by overseas companies and left the country. While many posts could be filled with young, enthusiastic and energetic scientists, engineers and technicians, a solid core of veterans is essential on a nuclear project. Do they still exist in South Africa? Can they be lured back to the country? Or could foreigners be recruited?

Where would the project be organisationally located? Eskom is clearly not the place for it. Even if Eskom was not a disaster area – and it is – it is a utility, not a research and development (R&D) agency. The South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa) is an R&D agency, and it has a nuclear site complete with a nuclear (research) reactor. But Necsa is, currently, also in a mess. Recreating a PBMR company is unlikely to be feasible at the moment.

And who would pay for it? Government is not exactly rolling in money. There is one possible way out: get the private sector involved. Make it a public–private partnership. Ideally, let the private sector hold a majority stake (the State could have a ‘golden share’ allowing it to veto certain things, like relocating the project overseas). And, given that the South African private sector is not known for investing in cutting-edge technology ventures, even allow foreign investors in (perhaps through their local subsidiaries), as long as they don’t have a more than 49% share. But I’m afraid I don’t see that happening.

And then again, maybe this is just much ado about nothing. Maybe Mantashe is just playing politics, trying to assuage various lobbies and factions especially in the trade unions.