For the third column in a row, I am focusing on the conflict in the north-eastern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado. This is because it poses a threat to the whole of Southern Africa, including South Africa. It is not a case that the Islamist insurgency can just keep on expanding indefinitely, for religious and cultural factors will impose limits to its advance. But the creation of a de facto Islamist stronghold in north-east Mozambique would facilitate terrorist attacks on targets in other Southern African countries, perhaps by international Islamists. There are plenty of targets available – local Christian, Jewish, Hindu, non- and anti-Islamist Muslim, and secular institutions and people, as well as international American, British, French and Indian targets (whether real or symbolic).
To reiterate, the Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado is driven by both domestic and international factors. It was unquestionably made possible by entirely domestic factors of marginalisation, neglect, exploitation, government corruption and so on. But it drew inspiration and legitimisation from international Islamist/jihadi forces and the Cabo Delgado insurgents have pledged allegiance to ‘Islamic State’ (IS). And the dramatic increase in recent months in the insurgents’ capabilities and aggressiveness, plus their adoption of IS techniques and procedures, suggests that they have received foreign help, probably advisers and instructors infiltrated by sea.
The Mozambique government has to face reality, that the original triggers of the insurgency were internal. Unfortunately, the Mozambique government is refusing to acknowledge that there are domestic factors driving the insurgency. According to Mozambique news agency AIM, Mozambican Foreign Minister Veronica Macamo, speaking in the country’s capital of Maputo on December 1, claimed that the insurgency in Cabo Delgado was not only inspired from abroad but originated from abroad as well.
As South African security specialist Jasmine Opperman repeatedly and correctly stresses, a purely military approach to the conflict won’t work. An integrated strategy, incorporating military, police, intelligence and, most importantly, socioeconomic development aspects must be developed and implemented. But all the evidence so far is that Maputo is trying to treat the problem as a purely military one. The country’s attempts to use foreign military contractors to spearhead operations show that Maputo is both aware of the severe inadequacies of its own security forces and wants to keep foreign national military forces out of the area. Any foreign army troops would, one suspects, find plenty of legitimate grievances among the people of Cabo Delgado, and report these to their governments, resulting in strong pressure on the Mozambique government to carry out major reforms that it does not really want to make, for they could undermine its power.
It is true that, in her speech, Macamo said “we believe that this is a phenomenon that requires collective and global efforts”. But, at the Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit on the Cabo Delgado crisis, held at the end of last month, the Mozambique government did not present a plan to fight the insurgency, but a ‘shopping list’ of military equipment that it desired, journalist and analyst Peter Fabricius reported. Mozambique President Filipe Nyusi didn’t even attend the summit. Again, this signals that Maputo is refusing to face reality, is seeking panaceas, and wants help only on its own, totally unrealistic, terms.
It is thus unsurprising that SADC’s response has been entirely symbolic: to set up a Regional Centre to Combat Terrorism, expected to only become operational next year. As long as Maputo shies away from meaningful internal reforms (such as a genuine crackdown on corruption), SADC countries have no choice but to remain aloof from the conflict.
There is another very good reason to maintain this aloofness. In her speech, Macamo revealed critically important information: the Mozambique government had no knowledge of the command and leadership structure of the insurgents, nor where or how they were getting their funding. In other words, Mozambique has no meaningful intelligence about the Islamists at all. That makes fighting the insurgents effectively impossible. In conflicts such as these, intelligence is absolutely critical. And all forms of intelligence are required, from very low level observations by ordinary soldiers and police officers on routine patrol, interviews with civilians, interrogations of prisoners, reports from covert observation posts, coastal and offshore naval patrols, aerial reconnaissance, signals intelligence, and foreign intelligence.
Currently, the Mozambique government is losing the war. Temporary security force successes are meaningless.
This all puts South Africa in a very awkward spot. The world’s powers will expect South Africa to take the lead in any response to the conflict. But the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been underfunded for years; both the South African Air Force (SAAF) and South African Navy (SAN) have inadequate spares stocks and suffer from high levels of equipment unserviceability. And very few South Africans (including most of those of Portuguese descent) can speak Portuguese. At this time, South Africa has to keep out of the conflict. Sell weapons, yes; send troops, no. Maputo’s head-in-the-sand attitude provides a good reason for such a policy.
But Pretoria has to start preparing for a conflict that seems unavoidable. Money must be released to restore the operational capabilities of the SANDF, with priority going to the SAAF, then the SAN, and then (a defensive measure) to strengthen border security. The capabilities of intelligence, reconnaissance, special and airborne forces must be augmented. And Portuguese language skills must be boosted. This will all take time. At least a year, if an urgent start was made now. But this war is going to last for years yet: I would guess at least five years.
Very importantly, South Africa also needs to gather socioeconomic, demographic, geographic and cultural intelligence on Cabo Delgado, as well as intelligence on the Islamists. Remember, military action needs to be one element of an integrated security, intelligence and socioeconomic development strategy. Such a strategy can only be developed if it is known what the local people want and need and fear and resent. It is already clear that Pretoria cannot rely on Maputo for such information. And if South Africa does have to get involved in the conflict, it should try to focus its operations on air support (especially helicopters), naval support, intelligence, special forces operations and, not least, military development and aid operations – field engineers building roads, SANDF doctors and medics setting up and running clinics, and so on. The time to start plans and preparations is now.