South Africa’s programme to acquire a number of new nuclear power plants (NPPs) seems to be suffering from yet another delay. The requests for proposals to the various groups interested in constructing these new NPPs that were apparently meant to have been issued on April 1 were not, in fact, issued. There is currently no indication of when they might be issued. As is generally known, government policy remains that the country should acquire 9.6 GWe of nuclear generating capacity by 2030. Depending on the capacity of the reactors chosen, this could required the construction of six to nine reactors. This, note, does not mean six to nine NPPs – one NPP can be composed of several reactors.

It is also generally known that this policy is most controversial. For example, does the country really need 9.6 GWe of nuclear capacity? Predictions of the country’s future electricity demand have declined significantly since the original nuclear requirement was drawn up. On the other hand, this decline is due to the current electricity crisis and the reluctance of anyone to make significant investments when the country cannot guarantee an assured electricity supply. Do not forget that the Coega Industrial Development Zone was pretty much stillborn because investors could not be assured that their proposed plants and factories would have any reliable power source. When the electricity crisis ends, investments may start flowing again and the future demand curve may jump up sharply. Also, experience in other emerging markets indicates that, if a country wants to achieve sustained economic growth, it must make sure that its electricity- generating capacity grows even more rapidly than its wider economy does.

Yet, there are a couple of things that are very clear and, for someone pronuclear like me, concerning. Firstly, the official timescale is now completely ridiculous. It is now only 14 years to 2030 and there is no way at all that the country could build 9.6 GWe of nuclear capacity in such a short timescale. If everything goes perfectly, the first new NPP (assuming it has no more than two reactors) could be operational by then. But that would amount to only one quarter to one third of the programme. Secondly, I have been told by people who are well informed that the South African construction industry is currently simply not capable of undertaking such a huge project as the proposed nuclear new build programme. David Crawford of QSI has gone on record, elsewhere in this edition, about the lack of project managers to oversee, and skilled artisans to execute, the programme. But he is not the only one to have warned me of these and related problems.

On top of this, South Africa is quite properly planning to acquire the latest generation of large-scale NPPs, the so-called Generation III+. To digress for a moment, Gen I reactors were developed in the 1950s and 1960s, Gen II reactors were developed in the 1970s and 1980s and equip the bulk of NPPs operating outside the former Soviet bloc today (South Africa’s Koeberg is Gen II), while the first Gen III reactors started operation in Japan in 1996. Gen III+ designs are a significant development of Gen III designs, being simpler, more fuel efficient and safer. Gen IV reactors, which include, but are not limited to, small modular reactors, are currently being developed.

Gen III+ reactor designs include Westinghouse’s AP1000, Areva/EDF’s EPR, Rosatom’s VVER-TOI, Hitachi’s ABWR, Korea HNP’s (KHNP’s) APR 1400 and China’s CNNC/CGN Hualong One. CNNC/CGN, EDF, KHNP, Rosatom and Westinghouse are all expected to bid for the South African programme. Other (Chinese and Japanese) companies may do likewise. Unfortunately, while all of these reactors are currently under construction in various locations around the world, none of them are currently in operation (although four Gen III precursors of the Gen III+ ABWR design have been commercially operated in Japan and it is hoped they will start operating again soon; ABWR stands for ‘advanced boiling water reactor’).

Yet, within the next two to three years, there will be examples of all, or nearly all, of these designs in operation. It will then be possible to ascertain their real-world performance as against their hoped-for performance cited in their respective brochures. Given this, given that the new NPP programme is suffering further delay, given the completely unrealistic timeframe for the project, I would argue that it would make sense to formalise the delay and postpone acquisition for a couple of years. Let’s see and evaluate how the Gen III+ designs work out in practice.

There are other advantages to a delay as well. South Africa is in its worst political crisis since it became fully democratic and the new nuclear programme is clearly being sucked into it. The country’s economy is in a bad way, raising concerns about the affordability of the nuclear programme. The thing with nuclear is that the vast bulk of the costs are upfront: once an NPP is built and commissioned, nuclear power becomes incredibly cheap. And Gen III+ NPPs will last 60 years, if not 70, so the long-term economic benefits will be huge. The last ones to be built in the local programme will last into the 22nd century! But, at the moment, all that people see is the looming mountain of the upfront costs and the 22nd century is so far away, it does not bear thinking about. But, over the next two to three years, the political crisis should be resolved and the economy should show signs of recovery; the political, economic and financial uncertainties and fears around the programme should disperse and the country would be better placed to choose the best design of reactor for its needs. So, let’s delay the programme for 24 to 36 months. Let the work start under clearer political and economic skies and not under the current storm clouds.