It is hardly possible to overstate the crisis in the South African Department of Defence (DoD) which, in its current configuration, is risking the lives of the country’s soldiers as well as South Africa’s reputation, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) executive director Jakkie Cilliers said on Thursday.

Dicussing the ISS’ policy brief on the 2014 Defence Review that was approved by Cabinet on March 17, Cilliers said the review was “quite frank” with regard to the state of the South African defence sector.

“The impact of successive efforts at managerial [level] to ‘reinvent’ defence, to apply the Public Finance Management Act to the department and lack of will to prioritise and make tough decisions on personnel has led to virtual paralysis.  The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is a bloated and hollow force with limited combat capability and the review is candid about the crisis,” he said.

He noted that the ISS policy brief made the point that South Africa’s foreign policy ambitions and domestic security requirements were out of step with the budget allocation and attention being given to defence.

ISS senior researcher André Roux said with the current structure, budget, equipment and personnel, the SANDF was stretched to support its current force employment strategy on land, sea and in the air.

The ISS suggested three measures that would have to be taken over the next year to put the country’s defence force on a sustainable path in future.

“Defence expenditure must increase quite sharply in the short term along the levels proposed in the review.  Government expenditure is under severe pressure but given the size of the hole that the department is in, it needs more money,” Cilliers said.

He added that the medium- and long-term defence expenditure targets set by the review were realistic and relatively modest. 

After bumping expenditure up by 20.5% and 18.9% above the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework forecast for the next two years, the Defence Review asked that defence expenditure increase at an average of 6.8% a year thereafter. 

“We believe that South Africa should be spending around 2.4% of gross domestic product on defence – in line with its political ambitions,” Cilliers said.

Speaking at a media briefing on the 2014 Defence Review in April this year, Minister of Defence and Military Veterans Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula noted that “government does not have a choice [at this point in time]” with respect to allocating more funds to defence, adding that she believed government realised it was faced with two choices – either let the defence force decline, or restore and reorganise it.

“Government says it will ensure it does not decline [and] is already committed to supporting the defence force,” she said.

Meanwhile, Cilliers said the ISS believed that the DoD also had to rid itself of its excess staff and, recommending that the Department of Military Veterans be closed and its function transferred to the Department of Social Welfare.

“The Department will not move to sustainability without the implementation of all these critical components.  Simply increasing the defence vote without ridding the department of its excess staff and undertaking the other reforms listed will not do,” he said.

Roux further noted that, when analysing the capacity of the SANDF, it was also important to look at fit-for-purpose equipment, vehicles and personnel as well as sustainment systems for deployments.

He said the Defence Review acknowledged that a realignment and capability expansion, as was needed, would lead to an initial decline in operational capacity.

“[However], this ties into one of the challenge areas not adequately addressed in the review – that of training,” Roux said.

He explained that it was problematic to deploy forces to conduct war-fighting tasks in a peacekeeping environment, often with restrictions on the type and number of weapon systems that may be deployed, with rules of engagement restrictions and interoperability challenges in working with other intervention forces. 

“Effective training can mitigate these challenges; however, to do this you need to invest more in training staff, equipment and facilities, and especially training time. [However,] expanding your training and preparation will lead to less [immediate] operational availability,” Roux said.

He stated that the country faced similar challenges with regard to equipment, vehicle and weapon system refurbishment, acquisition and sustainment processes to re-establish core capacities.

“Even if treasury were to release adequate funds to service, repair or refurbish the hundreds of currently unserviceable vehicles – the capacity of industry to execute this is very limited in their ability to ‘surge’ – it will take years within the existing industrial base to accomplish this – money doesn’t fix everything,” he said.

Roux said this tied into the procurement dilemma and the disconnect between the defence force acquisition environment and the Armscor State arms industry structure and process.

Meanwhile, Cilliers said the state of the DoD and the long-delayed decision to embark on a revision of policy, almost two decades after the 1996 White Paper on Defence, had raised questions about the lack of foresight among political and military leadership during this period.

“Similar to the country’s electricity crisis, long-term planning in government is not working. As with [State-owned power utility] Eskom, the lights have to literally go out before someone pays attention.  In the case of the SANDF, the consequences may be much more serious,” he said.

Cilliers noted that the ISS believed that government had to re-establish a strategic planning capability in the office of the Presidency to avoid the type of long-term planning failures evident in respect of Eskom and the DoD.