For the next year, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will be the chairperson of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). A significant development, given that regional actors (from East and Southern Africa) played such a major role both in the country’s recent conflicts and in its attempts at finding some kind of sustainable resolution.

It should not be forgotten that several regional powers were at the centre of the initial efforts to overthrow the Mobutu Sese Seko regime, while a number of SADC members were involved directly in supporting Laurent Kabila in staving off a subsequent threat from Rwanda and Uganda.

Then, after the assassination of Kabila in 2001, and the naming of his son, Joseph Kabila, as the country’s new head of State, several SADC members, including South Africa, emerged as central figures in the facilitation and eventual conclusion of a peace accord, which was signed in Pretoria in late 2002 and led to the creation of a transitional government in 2003.

The country also chose to join the SADC regional bloc, despite the fact that its geographical location could have seen it join other formations.

This all occurred when a quite different atmosphere prevailed within the SADC. It was still living in the warm, albeit fading, glow generated primarily by the emergence of a democratic South Africa, when nothing seemed too big or complicated to be addressed and when there was still a feeling that almost anything was possible.

That’s not to say that there weren’t definite jealousies or indications of countries acting purely out of what was, at times, destructive self-interest. However, it is fairly safe to suggest that the region had not yet fallen entirely foul of the cynicism and destructive realpolitik that emerged once Zimbabwe started to implode in earnest.

At the time, there was an air of change and a willingness to engage, despite what had been ugly, bitter and brutal conflicts throughout the Great Lakes region.

However, greed and opportunism is also an ever-present reality in a country whose history is littered with private and official pillaging of its natural wealth.

Here it is easy to point to a ‘resources curse’, with the DRC having all the natural features, bar, perhaps, oil, that can make it either a pivotal regional force, or a divisive neighbour.

Firstly, it has near-unparalleled mineral resources (a factor that has at times been criminally exploited both by its citizens and local warlords, as well as by its belligerent neighbours). Then there is its latent low- carbon energy potential that is arguably unrivaled internationally, with hydroelectricity resources possibly able to generate upwards of 100 000 MW of electricity for sale domestically, regionally and possibly even inter- continentally.

It is also this energy potential, centred primarily on the mighty Congo river, that will make or break this massive, but complex, country’s contribution to regional integration, or con-tinued disjointedness.

For decades, energy observers have salivated over the incredible hydro potential at Inga Falls, near the mouth of this water course, where a couple of relatively modest stations already exist. It is estimated that the so-called ‘Grand Inga’ project, should it proceed, could produce a whopping 40 000 MW of electricity, which is nearly equivalent to the currently installed base in South Africa – still far and away the biggest power producer in Africa.

Necessarily, such an ambitious endeavour would have to be developed in phases, with the next stage, dubbed ‘Inga 3’, possibly involving a run-of-river solution capable of producing 4 320 MW of electricity, which would be sufficient for domestic needs, with surplus available for neighbouring countries to the south – itself initially a sore point, given that no power had been set aside for the Republic of Congo, on the other side of the watery border with its far larger neighbour, the DRC.

For that reason the project, until relatively recently anyway, was conceived as a regional initiative, under the aegis of the Western Corridor (Westcor), whose shareholders include utilities from Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Namibia and South Africa.

The plan was to make Inga 3 bankable and develop it as a precursor to the Grand Inga – a vision that was meant to have been deployed in phases between 2009 and 2021.

Last year, no less august a body than the World Energy Council hosted a financing workshop in London, bringing together governments, banks, technical organisations and civil society groups. And while the timeframes appeared ambitious, the business and political case looked solid, especially given South Africa’s power stresses.

Fast-forward one year and the picture seems to have changed materially. The DRC government seems to want to proceed solo, apparently having found an anchor offtaker in the form of a BHP Billiton aluminum smelter.

DRC government and utility officials are reportedly no longer attending Westcor meetings.

Naturally, there is much unhappiness and some have even gone so far as to suggest that BHP Billiton is manipulating the situation for narrow commercial reasons. But the world’s biggest resources group has pointed out that its smelter, for which a study has been conducted, would consume less than half of what Inga 3 would produce, adding that there would be surplus available for domestic and regional needs.

It is even possible that domestic politics may be at play, with some showing a lingering suspicion of the SADC and its role in supporting Joseph Kabila’s rise to power and continuing to support his government.

In other words, Kabila’s opponents may seek to use the breakdown of Westcor as a way of building anti-SADC political momentum.

No doubt, tensions could rise even further as Pretoria prepares to hand over the chair-personship to Kinshasa.

In the end, the promise of Inga is something that has to be driven by the DRC government and its utility. But, whoever is in charge will surely realise that custodianship will only have full value if it is developed as a regional powerhouse.

With the DRC at the helm of the SADC, it would, arguably, be the perfect opportunity to advance such a cause.

Instead, the project might once again retreat into the inertia of the last three decades, where it may make sense technically, economically and possibly even environ- mentally (although there are already environmental groups worried about what Grand Inga could mean, despite it low-carbon profile), but where politics once again makes its advancement impossible.