There has been much commentary about whether anything has in fact changed at Eskom over the past six years after the country descended into its first national load-shedding episode since 2008 – an event which felt much like Yogi Berra’s proverbial “déjà vu all over again”.

The arguments centred on whether sufficient action has been taken by the utility to deal decisively with the problems asso- ciated with wet coal, which was blamed (as was the case in 2008) for the losses on March 6 that resulted in 14 hours of economic and social pain.

At the root of the disruption was the loss of more than 3 000 MW at Kendal, in Mpumalanga, the largest power station in Eskom’s 40 000-MW-plus fleet.

Four units were switched off after wet, fine coal clogged the logistics system linking Kendal to BHP Billiton’s Khutala colliery, effectively stranding the units from their fuel source.

Wet coal in itself is not a problem for Kendal, which burns about 50 000 t of coal daily, of which 40 000 t is supplied fresh from the mine. But when the bulk of the coal is both fine and wet, Kendal (which typically requires coarse coal to comprise between 60% and 70% of what it burns) runs into problems.

The disruption reportedly coincided with a shift change at the underground portion of the mine, which resulted in a halt to the supply of coarse coal, which was replaced with wet, fine material from the opencast operation.

The slurrylike material clogged the conveyors and material-handling systems and between 1:22 and 7:58 on March 6, four units tripped, owing to empty coal bunkers, despite Kendal having more than 56 days of stocks, covering an area the size of four rugby fields.

It took most of Thursday for Kendal’s employees to clear the blockages and, using material from the stockpiles, blended with underground coal and some heavy-fuel oil, all the station’s units were back on line by 17:26.

I offer the above diagnostic not in Eskom’s defence, because surely there was an unacceptable pit-to-plant communications breakdown. Nevertheless, it does serve to highlight just how much has changed since 2008.

Back then, it took days for Eskom to explain what had gone wrong, let alone to outline the systems it would be introducing to restore system balance.

Load-shedding is painful and arguably unacceptable, given the amount of time and resources that have been directed Eskom’s way. However, it is also incorrect to argue that nothing has changed.

There is, today, far better system visibility and vastly improved communications. There are also properly canvassed protocols in place to deal with those crises that will almost inevitably arise as a result of the inadequate investments in electricity supply and the delayed delivery of new capacity – the reasons for which are now well known.