Well, at long last, the Seriti Commission of Inquiry into South Africa’s acquisition of modern fighters, fighter-trainers, light utility and maritime helicopters, frigates and submarines is now under way. Commissions of inquiry, in many countries, are often portrayed as instruments whose function is more the protection of govern- ment than the unveiling of the truth, but they often do something very valuable indeed, at least for serious researchers – they can bring lots of important documents into the public domain. Nothing truly secret, of course, but often a lot of useful information becomes available. Hopefully, the Seriti Commission will do this, at least.

The release of information is required because the bulk of the Department of Defence (DoD) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) have, nearly 20 years after the advent of democracy, still not adjusted to the fact that they exist in a free country, in which they are respon- sible to the taxpayers, and that there are currently no major exter- nal threats facing the country. They are still not as open as they should be.

Now, I must instantly qualify this by exempting the South African Navy (SAN) from this. As a journalist, I have always found it very easy to get information from the navy. Arranging interviews is, in principle, very easy – the only problem is coordinating my diary with that of the admiral I’m going to talk to. And the SAN website is the best and most informative of the SANDF websites.

The South African Air Force (SAAF) is not as open as the SAN, but it is a lot more open than the South African Army. And the SAAF does participate in air shows (budget permitting). An army general recently admitted to me that his service was rather a “closed envelope”. An annual media breakfast by the Chief of the Army is not enough! Again, a qualification: the Engineering Formation (SA Engineering Corps) is a lot more accessible than the rest of the army. But, even so, underestimating the interest in its equipment and activi- ties, it rarely puts its head above the public relations parapet.

Of course, at the moment, the SANDF has a problem: the lack of funding. Leaks to the media have painted a picture of ground units being effectively nonopera- tional, aircraft not flying, ships in harbour. Government may very well want to minimise the public’s awareness of the actual state of the SANDF. Certainly, it is grimly amusing when government or defence spokespeople solemnly aver that they do not discuss SANDF readiness in public. When a country facing no major external threats refuses to reveal or discuss military readiness levels in public, it means the armed forces have no readiness. It is quite easy to get information on readiness on, say, the US armed forces, or the British ones, even though these countries are involved in an actual war.

Not that there can ever be total openness. I have carefully and purposely used the term “major external threats” throughout this column because South Africa does face minor external threats, which require at least a partly military response. Most obviously, there is the threat of piracy – kept at bay from South African waters by the SAN and SAAF patrolling the northern Mozambican Channel, in what is codenamed Operation Copper. And then there is the violation of the country’s borders by poaching syndicates (involving both South Africans and foreigners) to poach wildlife (most famously, at the moment, rhinos for their horns), which, among many other things, undermines the tourist industry and damages the economy. (How long before tourists accidently stumble upon poachers and get shot at? This has certainly happened elsewhere in Africa.) The SA Army, (backed by the SAAF) is responsible for the country’s border security, a mission designated Operation Corona.

Operations Copper and Corona are just that – real operations, not training exercises or simulations. Although actual shooting may be rare, these missions are not risk free. At least one sailor and 17 soldiers and airmen have died executing these missions in the last three years. And, of course, SANDF units have been assigned to the United Nations intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where they face well armed rebels. So there are certain types of information regarding these operations and the units assigned to them that would, if made public, be of use to the poachers, pirates and rebels. You must not fool yourself: these pirates, poachers and rebels – or at least their bosses or commanders – will have access to the Internet and will be looking for all information that could help their activities. Also, of course, even in peacetime, the Special Forces have to keep a low profile.

However, these, at the moment, are very much the exceptions. The DoD and most of the SANDF should be much more open to public scrutiny than it is. For example, it has been reported that the South African Military Health Services has more personnel than the SAN. Is that really so? And, if so, why? There might very well be good answers to these questions. But the real point is that it is difficult to find official numbers on SANDF personnel strengths: that should not be the case.