Under Vision 2020, the standing army will be organised into a mechanised division, a motorised division and airborne forces. It was decided last year that the mechaniseddivision will, under Project Hoefyster, be primarily equipped with a locally adapted version of Finland’s Patria AMV family of 8 × 8 wheeled armoured fighting vehicles – the South African Army will acquire 264, in five versions. But the motorised units also need modernisa- tion.
“Regarding the motorised forces – the Army is a complete system, and needs to be treated as a complete system,” highlights Shoke. “We have to look at the Army holistically – if you focus too much on one capability area, you could compromise others. So, when deciding on new equipment, we need to look at the whole system. For example, if we want to buy new artillery, we need to also look at all the related systems, such as radars, unmanned air vehicles and logistics vehicles.” Another key consideration is that “we need to be able to have open production lines”, guaranteeing long-term spares and other support.
Under Vision 2020, the Army aspires to be a force that is affordable, balanced, modern, and technologically advanced. A key technology and equipment priority is what the South African Army calls C4I3RS – command, control, computers, communications, information, intelligence, infrastructure, reconnaissance and surveillance. Other such top priorities are force projection, effective operation in different and complex – but foreseen – environments, night-fighting capability, force protection, improved weapons effects and capabilities, lessening of the logistics footprint, and human sciences. A further priority regarding logistics is the development of systems that are flexible, agile, and can support forces for sustained periods in undeveloped areas where there are no fixed front lines, and no secure rear areas.
Although most South Africans still seem not to grasp the fact, the South African Army is on operational service in dangerous or potentially dangerous places – the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, and Darfur in Sudan – with the United Nations (UN).
Over the last 20 years, it has not been uncom- mon for UN peacekeeping missions to tip into shooting wars, even if only briefly – for example, in Bosnia, in the 1990s, Sierra Leone, in 2000, and intermittently in the DRC, from 2003 to date. Sierra Leone provides an example of just how fast, and unexpectedly, things can go wrong for peacekeepers – a peace accord was signed in July 1999, only to collapse nine months later (May 2000) with surprise attacks on the UN peacekeeping force (established in October 1999) – more than 700 peacekeepers were taken prisoner. (During the entire duration of the mission in Sierra Leone, 169 peacekeeping troops and two military observers died, but this figure includes accidents and sickness as well as fighting.) One UN peacekeeper base was besieged for ten weeks, before being relieved. It required independent military intervention by the UK to end the crisis. Modern peacekeeping thus requires modern, capable forces if it is to be successful.
Peacekeeping has a medical aspect as well – the UN strictly forbids the deployment of troops who have HIV/Aids. This is one of the reasons the SA Army has been so dismayed by the recent ruling by the Pretoria High Court that the South African National Defence Force has been acting unconstitutionally in refusing to recruit people with HIV/Aids.
The other main reason is that soldiers – indeed, all ser-vice people – must be fit and healthy, without continuing dependence on medication. “The focus on HIV was incorrect because we talk of a comprehensive health assessment, which implies we check everything,” points out Shoke. “It should be common knowledge that, in order to fulfil our operational requirements, the implication is that soldiers with the right physical and psychological make-up are required.”
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