It is still not known how the latest, and serious, delay in the €20-billion ($26,6-billion) Airbus A400M military transport aircraft programme will affect the South African companies that are partners in this major European programme.

In the middle of this month, EADS – which is by far the biggest shareholder in Airbus Military – admitted that it wanted to restructure the A400M programme and delay resuming production of the aircraft until flight testing had achieved "adequate maturity", with deliveries of production aircraft to customers starting "around three years after first flight". The company also wants to renegotiate the A400M contract, almost certainly to ease delivery schedules, and increase unit price – last year it emerged that the A400M had become a heavy loss maker for EADS. To date, the company has had to make provisions of €1,75-billion to cover culminative programme delays.

The A400M has not flown yet. The first complete A400M was rolled out at the final assembly line, near Seville, in Spain, on June 26, 2008, and it had been hoped that the aircraft would make its first flight at the end of last October. Now, it is not expected until late this year, perhaps, around September, meaning that deliveries, originally meant to have started before the end of this year, will not start until late 2012.

EADS blames problems with the full authority digital engine control software for the aircraft's engines. But the company refuses to comment on reports in European media that the A400M is up to 12 t overweight, and is undershooting its planned cargo capacity by some 3 t. EADS does say that the programme is facing issues "common with any military development" and that some modifications to the design have been identified. While the first A400M, known as MSN001, is grounded, the second, MSN002, remains on the final assembly line, and the delivery of structures and components for MSN003 was halted several months ago.

The A400M project involves nine partner countries, seven of them European. These partners, and the number of the aircraft they have currently on order, are Belgium (7), France (50), Germany (60), Luxembourg (1), Malaysia (4), South Africa (8), Spain (27), Turkey (10) and the UK (25).

It is important to stress that South Africa joined the A400M programme primarily to boost the country's aerospace industry, and only secondarily to modernise the South African Air Force's (SAAF's) transport fleet, and this country's workshare on the A400M was last year forecast to be worth €750-million over the next 20 years. The South African companies involved in the A400M programme are Aerosud, Denel Saab Aerostructures (DSA), Grintek (formerly AMS), and Omniples, with Armscor providing engineering services.

Aerosud is mainly responsible for secondary structures. These are nose fuselage linings, cargo hold linings, and cockpit linings, but the company is also making the cockpit rigid bulkhead, the wing tips and the nose fuselage galleys. The wing tips are quite important because they will contain elements of the aircraft's defence aids subsystem.

DSA is responsible for the top shells for the centre fuselage section; these can be thought of as being equivalent to roof panels. The company is producing two top shells for each aircraft – one each in front of and behind the wing box, which joins the wing to the fuselage. In addition, it is making very large wing/fuselage fairings, manufactured mainly from composite materials but including aluminium parts. Each such fairing is 15 m long, 7 m wide, and nearly 3 m high. DSA is also contributing the ribs and spars for the tail fin, and centre wing box structural components.

Grintek is providing lifetime monitoring systems for the aircraft, and Omniples is producing satellite communications antennas.

So, what does this delay mean for South Africa? It is a serious problem for the SAAF, and for the South African Army looking forward to having the significant capacity of the A400M to support troops deployed in peacekeeping in Africa. The country will probably be forced to lease other aircraft to fill the gap, driving up costs.

For local industry, the picture is likely to be more mixed. The local A400M component and aerostructure production lines are likely to be standing idle, with adverse cost and employment implications. On the other hand, there will be more time to carry out the redesign and manufacturing alterations necessary to get the weight problem under control.

The real downside is the risk of loss of business. Previous delays in the programme have already cost the A400M opportunities in Australia and Canada. Fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively, both countries urgently needed to modernise and expand their military transport fleets, and so selected a combination of Lockheed Martin's new-generation Hercules, the C-130J, and Boeing's C-17 Globemaster III. The C-130J's cargo capacity is less than that of the A400M, but the C-17's is greater.

Reportedly, the C-130J has a maximum payload of almost 21,8 t, the A400M of 37 t, and the C-17 of just over 76,6 t. Denmark, India, Italy and Norway have also chosen the C-130J.

The UK already operates both the C-130J and C-17, and urgently needs the A400M to replace its fleet of 40-year-old C-130K Hercules, which are being rapidly worn out in supporting combat operations in Afghanistan. The British are publicly furious with EADS and Airbus Military. The UK Defence Minister stated that they "cannot accept a three- to four-year delay". There is now a very real chance that Britain will reduce the number of A400Ms it has on order – outright cancellation is unlikely, but not impossible – and buy more of the highly successful C-17s instead. And more export markets will be lost to the US designs over the next three years.

The A400M programme will continue because Europe has invested too much in it to let it fail. But the total number of aircraft that will be built is very likely to be less than once hoped. South African industry will still reap benefits from the A400M, but, it seems, not as many as originally forecast.